Vision without Funding is Hallucination. Most ambitions are limited by resources; difficult choices and compromises need to me made. By way of example, the UK has an outstanding Fire Brigade, but since most of the UK population will never directly require their services, the level of funding required is subject to close and regular scrutiny. We only truly appreciate such services during times of crisis when the benefits of investment in equipment and training are recognised.
So too with Defence. The primary responsibility of any government is the protection of its citizens. The Armed Forces are an insurance policy against an uncertain world – our “premiums” are governed by the cover required, and the prevailing threat environment.
Although the cost of defence has risen over the years, much of this is inflation-driven; the accepted metric of national Defence Spending is as a proportion of GDP. In 1984 the UK spent 5.5% GDP on defence, and at the end of the Cold War this had reduced to 4.3%. With the demise of the Soviet Union, most nations capitalised on the “Peace Dividend” associated with a less dangerous world, and defence budgets reduced accordingly; indeed, the UK now spends around 2.3%.
Of note, the UK Defence Budget also includes military pensions – 3 decades ago the armed forces were nearly 3 times the size they are today, so the Defence budget is also paying for pensions for around 400 000 veterans out of the Defence Budget.
And, the UK is a nuclear power, and spends around 6% of its annual defence budget maintaining a Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD) capability. However, the UK is in the process of replacing the old Vanguard-Class nuclear deterrent with the new Dreadnaught system, committing another 6% of the Defence Budget for at least a decade. In addition, the UK has committed to supporting Ukraine with a further £3Bn/year representing around another 6% of the defence budget.
As a result, over the past few years, the UK defence budget available for “conventional” military capability (not including nuclear and Ukraine support) has reduced from 94% GDP to 82% GDP – a 13% reduction. Even if the UK government does commit to increasing defence spending from 2.3% to 2.5% GDP, that will still represent a reduction in “conventional” military budget.
Following the sacrifices of 2 World Wars, the UK (and most allies) invested in technology to find ways to mitigate the brutality and human cost of attritional warfare. Modern equipment and precision weapons are expensive, but all contribute towards avoiding a highly attritional land army vs army ground war. However, adversaries like Russia – with a limited regard for the human casualties of war – drag their enemies into a grinding war of attrition, with devastating consequences (as demonstrated in their war in Ukraine).
If the UK fails to respond to the prevailing threats and invest in defence, it risks relying on mass mobilisation and attritional warfare as its fallback option to protect the nation.
During the Cold War, although the UK’s military forces were not directly involved in conflict, the military budget was spent ensuring a credible and robust national capability to deter Soviet aggression. Electronic Warfare, counter-measures, guidance systems for weapons and the exploitation of technology were constantly evolved. However, for the past 35 years, in the absence of an Arms Race to focus investment, the focus has been on Quality not Quantity, and a slow but steady shift towards a focus on jobs rather than cost-effective military capability.
So is the answer simply to throw more money at the problem?
There is little doubt that more investment will be required, but as Henry Ford opined, “If you always do what you’ve always done, you’ll always get what you’ve always got”. It is a more dangerous world, but the challenge is very different, and a fresh approach is probably merited.
As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, the UK needs to exploit opportunities for innovation through technology, and at pace. Simulation, emulation and Mixed Reality offer very cost-effective options for developing military capability, and networked training – for both national and international customers – offers an excellent way to improve alliance credibility and leverage UK military training pedigree to generate export opportunities. The Uk could also leverage the wider intellectual horsepower – in abundance in the UK – in both academia and the SME community, to pioneer a Team UK approach to optimising our nation’s military capability.
The UK industrial base has immense potential, and investment in national military capability could – indeed should – not only enhance our defence credibility but also position the UK at the forefront of the expanding global defence export market.
Returning to the original question – What Price Defence – Is 2.5% enough? The government is conducting a Strategic Defence Review to enable an informed judgement about defence investment priorities. However, the tight fiscal environment appears to lead some to conclude that “2.5% is the answer, so what can I get for that?”
Nations like Poland have already decided to increase defence spending above 4% in recognition of the rapidly changing threat environment. President Trump has suggested that 5% is a more appropriate figure, and of course Russia is now spending over 30% GDP on defence as the nation has moved to a wartime economy. Whatever the answer, the world has changed, and our nation’s military capability must be transformed accordingly. This will not be an easy judgement for the government, but 2.5% GDP does not feel remotely close to what is required based on historical experience.
Difficult choices face the government, but as Benjamin Franklin once observed, “By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail”.
If you enjoyed this piece, click here to read Sean’s previous episode on the military challenges facing the UK and listen to Sean’s podcast series ‘InDefence’ here on YouTube.
