The deteriorating geopolitical environment is having profound effects on the British economy. After decades of globalisation the economy is undergoing a transition where “building renewal on foundations of national security, border security and economic security” is of growing importance. The recent Industrial Strategy contains many ideas for how to achieve this, but one area which goes underappreciated is the civilian maritime sector (with ‘maritime’ making just six appearances in the 160 page document). While the importance of undersea infrastructure has finally made its way into the national debate, much less discussed is the importance of the ships sailing above that infrastructure.
These ships would be vital in a time of crisis to keep Britain supplied and in moving military equipment to where it needs to go; as things stand, their availability is far from guaranteed.
Britain as a maritime nation depends on safe shipping, with 95% of its imports and exports by volume transported by sea. The UK maritime sector generates £116 billion annually and supports over 1.1 million jobs. Shipping alone directly contributes some £16 billion in GVA to the economy and enables £957 billion in UK trade, with 100,000 vessels calling at British ports every year. Yet, strategic sealift capacity – the ability to move military equipment, fuel, and critical goods by sea – has dwindled.
Across NATO we have seen a decline in national-flagged fleets and seafarer numbers, compromising the ability to secure supply chains. The UK is no exception and between 2009 and 2023, the number of militarily useful UK-flagged vessels dropped by 41% – from 841 to 495.
In crisis or wartime, the ability to quickly mobilise and access the necessary number and types of ships with nationally affiliated and trained crews becomes essential. Beyond the maritime community it is often unknown that a large number of global seafarers are Russian (over 10% in fact), in the event of a conflict between NATO and Russia, many ships would be unable to sail simply because their crews would be considered a security risk.
Given the expense of procuring such a capability directly, the UK should instead better leverage and support existing civil capacity. One avenue to explore would be securing strategic contracts with commercial shipping partners to reduce reliance on open-market chartering – which offers no guarantees in crisis.
While navies and shipping have historically been linked through national flagging, foreign flagging practices, complex ownership, cargo, and crewing structures have weakened this link over time. Across NATO, fewer vessels are now under the effective control of member states, affecting availability for sealift operations and eligibility for naval protection. The reality is however more complex and beneficial ownership – ultimate control of a vessel – more accurately represents availability, demonstrating the importance of building trust with owner-operators.
Ultimately, ship ownership, flagging and crew nationality will all combine to define suitability and availability of vessels in times of crisis.
To improve maritime security and sovereignty the UK ought to incentivise UK-flagged British-crewed ships, invest in reserve fleets and training and employment policies, and build public-private partnerships that can train in peacetime and deliver in wartime. Commercial shipping can no longer be viewed as separate from national security concerns and must be integrated into defence planning.
Helpfully, policies from Britain’s recent past and from its allies today provide useful guidance for implementing a securonomic approach; bringing together unions, industry, further education, the military, insurance, and a wide array of other important stakeholders.
There was in fact a brief resurgence of interest in the health of Britain’s sovereign shipping capacity in the late 1990s. The decline in the number of UK registered trading vessels was arrested in 1994 and in fact grew from around 1997 until 2010 when it once again began to decline (as shown in the graph below from a recent Nautilus International report). Though the reasons behind this are multi-faceted, a major factor was the approach laid out in the 1997 White Paper ‘British shipping: Charting a new course’. The paper and its recommendations provide plenty of ideas for how Britain can once more solve its sealift deficit.
Beyond recent British history, several other countries have recognised this NATO-wide problem and have started to take action. Sweden offers an interesting example, having revived its Total Defence model. At the heart of this model is civil-military collaboration, and Sweden, like the UK, relies on commercial shipping for strategic sealift capacity. Here, a ‘krigsplacering’ (wartime allocation) of vessels deemed essential for civil or military logistics helps secure access during crisis or wartime. While a legal framework exists for requisition, pre-registering vessels into a ‘readiness structure’ enables early coordination and collaboration with shipowners. Part of Sweden’s ‘whole-of-society’ approach to national security, this contrasts with the UK’s more reactive and less formalised ‘Ships Taken Up From Trade’ (STUFT) model. A model that has worked in the past when vessel and seafarer numbers were significantly higher.
Part of a wider effort to ensure transport capacity, the Swedish government is forming agreements with shipping lines to ensure ship capacity. The government is also introducing measures aimed at strengthening national shipping and securing crews. This includes a review of the tonnage tax system to boost Swedish-flagged vessels and enhance supply chain resilience, where potential changes include abolishing the stamp duty.
So far much of the debate surrounding what securonomics is and how it should be implemented has, not without good reason, focused on the defence industrial base and fixed critical national infrastructure. But given the UK’s reliance on shipping for its economy and moving its armed forces, this capacity gap demands attention (amid a storm of other urgent matters). The UK is currently unprepared for how difficult it would find this in a time of crisis.
Maritime resilience and readiness do not require vast ‘fleets in being’, but coherent and integrated planning, long-term strategic agreements, and the incentivisation of national shipping, with the added benefit of bolstering Britain’s shipping sector and creating jobs in peacetime.
*The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and independent of any political party affiliation or influence, nor do they represent the views of any of the above organisations.
