Labour’s defence policy journey: nearing the summit

Keir Starmer, in a recent interview with i, has sought to set out his stall on Labour’s defence policy should the party win the general election by committing to spending 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence – ‘as long as it is achievable within Labour’s borrowing rules’. Two weeks later, the Conservatives followed with their own announcement on their intention to reach 2.5% by 2030. These events show just how far Labour has come on defence policy since the end of Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. But the party still has more mountain to climb to be the electorate’s favourite on keeping them safe in an increasingly dangerous world. So just how far has Labour come, and what more can be done to reach the proverbial summit?

From damage control to (re)building the foundations

When Corbyn stepped down as leader of the Labour Party, Labour’s reputation on defence had been dealt catastrophic damage. Corbyn’s leadership came at a time when the Conservatives had seriously reduced investment in defence, and in opposition Labour should have been able to make significant hay out of criticising this. When Labour left government in 2010 they were spending 2.6% of GDP on defence; by the time Corbyn became party leader in 2015 the Conservatives had reduced this figure to just 2.0% (barely hitting the NATO spending target). Instead, the period between 2015-2020 saw considerable foot dragging on even the core principles of British national security, not least of which was well known opposition to the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

When Starmer took over in 2020, Labour’s reputation on defence policy required not only a fireman to extinguish further damage, but also a mason to rebuild it. In this, Starmer has made remarkable progress, albeit not yet as far reaching as it could be. According to Yougov polling in March 2020 on ‘Which political party would be the best at handling defence and security?’Labour trailed the Conservatives by 33 points. Today the gap is just three points. However, these figures hide one key factor: From March 2020 to the most recent poll, Labour has moved from 11% to 18%, an impressive achievement to be sure, but the decline in the Conservative’s reputation on defence has been more significant in closing the gap; they have fallen from a peak of 44% to 21%. Clearly, much of the electorate needs further convincing.

Over the past few years Starmer has achieved steady progress by focusing on reestablishing Labour’s reputation on the basics of defence. This has centred on reaffirming the Party’s commitment to the nuclear deterrent and to NATO.

It is understandable why Starmer has been cautious in moving beyond this. Defence is not considered an election winning issue. Despite its growing salience, and its vital contribution to national prosperity and security (Starmer himself said defence is the ‘number one issue for any government’) it simply is not at the forefront of many voters’ minds. Another consideration is the parlous situation facing the nation’s finances from growing debt, high interest rates and the pressure of years of underinvestment in public services – an unenviable inheritance. Committing to increasing defence spending to 2.5% was the next step in building on the firm foundations now in place and is certainly welcome.

Yet in order to overcome the final hurdle and overtake the Conservatives on the issue of defence, Starmer should go further. Given deteriorating global geopolitics, 2.5% simply will not be enough (at the same time, Britain needs to get more value for money in defence but that is a separate conversation). The billions of pounds spent on mitigating the impact of global conflict from eastern Europe to the Middle East barely scratches the surface on the costs of failing to deter aggression. Threats are proliferating and the UK needs the resources to meet them.

Leading the conversation

Dropping the ‘when conditions allow’ part of the commitment and aiming for 3% of GDP by 2030 would be a seismic shift, and position Labour as a party ready to lead the way and show the country they are the party of defence. There are no easy answers to funding this. Whether this is done through borrowing, cutting elsewhere, or increasing taxes is a matter for the politicians and the economists to decide. But they should bear in mind that it is hard to measure the cost-benefit of investing in defence and of deterring adversaries; much of the time successful deterrence looks like wasted money as a threat which money was spent on seeing off does not materialise. Crucially, spending a bit more now will likely save the UK a fortune down the line even if it is almost impossible to predict how much with any precision.

In addition to the necessity of protecting national security, a significant increase in defence spending will have several other benefits. Foremost of which would be Labour’s ability to direct this investment into the defence industry within the UK, rebuilding defence industrial capacity. Labour would be able to invest in areas which need it, creating jobs and building up regional economic resilience. It would also significantly increase the UK’s export potential; several opportunities have been missed in recent years due to limited capacity, the most recent case of which is the fact limited shipyard capacity could impact the likelihood of frigate exports to Norway.

Beyond the national security and economic case, increasing defence spending would also support another Labour objective: building closer ties with Britain’s European allies. The war in Ukraine has had a momentous impact on European attitudes to defence. Almost every European NATO member has significantly increased defence spending to meet the threat of Russian aggression. The uplift in some countries, even those with generous social security programmes, has been enormous: Swedenand Norway have both recently announced sizeable increases; Poland has increased spending from 2.2% of GDP to over 4% from 2021-2024; even Germany should, for the first time since 1991, hit the 2% figure. The list could go on, and will continue to grow over time. Somewhat embarrassingly, the UK was one of only two European NATO members from 2022 to 2023 to reduce their defence spending (the other was Greece which had been spending over 3% of GDP). Labour could find itself being given the cold shoulder in Europe if it were seen to not be taking defence as seriously as others.

Conclusion 

Labour has come a long way on defence policy under Keir Starmer. The first step was damage control following the Corbyn leadership, the next step was rebuilding public faith in Labour’s commitment to the core tenets of British defence policy. With Starmer’s commitment to 2.5% and firm commitments both to the nuclear deterrent and NATO, strong foundations are in place. But Starmer should now build on these. The opportunity is there for Labour to lead the national conversation on defence, but this will require stronger will to resource it. Despite the difficult economic circumstances Labour will inherit, it is well within the Party’s interests to invest more in defence, for the sake of national security, the economic benefits it will bring, and strengthening ties with Britain’s allies.

 

If you enjoyed this blog, see William’s previous piece ‘Why the Navy should be a cornerstone of Labour’s defence policy – reviving the 1998 Defence Review’.