The Defence Spending Dilemma: Building Public Support in an Age of Domestic Challenge

As war grinds on in Ukraine and the Middle East and the rules-based international order is placed under increasing strain, the UK’s security and prosperity is under growing threat. These challenges have only been compounded by the retrenchment of the United States under President Trump, which has seen one of the UK’s longest standing allies shift further and further away from the global values and alliances upon which the UK has long relied.

Slowly, and somewhat reluctantly, the UK and its allies have begun to step up, with NATO nations now pledging to spend 5% of GDP on defence and national security by 2035. However, this comes with many caveats. Only 3.5% of GDP will be spent on core defence and the remaining 1.5% will be spent on defence-related areas such as resilience and security. The announcement that Italy will class an £11 billion bridge to Sicily as defence spending highlights how broadly defence and national security is being defined. Meanwhile, Spain is doing all that it can to wriggle out of the pledge, while others will simply hope that the global threats have declined enough over the next 10 years to mean the targets are scaled back before anyone has to reach them.

But while officials hash out debates on precisely who will spend what and by when, there is a far quieter but nevertheless critical debate rumbling at home – a debate for the the attention, trust, and understanding of the British public, particularly the young, on the question of national defence.

At first glance, public support for boosting the UK’s defence budget appears robust. BFPG’s 2025 Survey of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy, found that 71% of Britons support raising defence spending to 3% of GDP either now or by the next parliament – the level increasingly seen as the minimum credible target in today’s environment. It is these topline figures that mean public support for defence spending has largely been taken for granted.

But this top-line figure conceals a deeper fragility. Once real-world trade-offs are introduced, public enthusiasm for defence spending evaporates. Six in ten Britons oppose higher defence spending if it comes at the expense of spending on the NHS, while just 22% support it. Meanwhile, nearly half of Britons oppose increasing defence spending if it means cuts to education or welfare. Even the most widely endorsed trade-off – increasing taxes – is opposed (38%) by more Britons than who support it (37%).

The reality is that in a difficult domestic environment, in which the cost-of-living crisis continues to bite, defence spending is not top of the agenda for most Britons. Their concerns, understandably, are focused on the issues that feel most pertinent to them – how much money they have, the state of their kids’ schools, the quality of healthcare they receive. For many Britons, while they appreciate that the world is dangerous, those threats feel far too removed from their day-to-day lives to matter as much as those more immediate concerns, particularly in a difficult domestic environment.

This sense of disconnect from UK defence is particularly profound among young people. While 60% of over-66s rank Russian aggression as one of the UK’s top three threats, only 25% of 18–25-year-olds agree. On China, the chasm widens further. A remarkable 81% of over-66s distrust Beijing, compared to just 41% of young people. More than six in ten 18–25-year-olds are comfortable with Chinese technology firms operating in the UK, a position held by just 12% of the oldest cohort.

These figures reflect more than differences in age. They point to a strategic culture gap – a divergence in how different generations interpret threat, value deterrence, and weigh Britain’s role in the world. For older Britons, whose formative memories include the Cold War, NATO’s post-9/11 interventions, and perhaps even national service, the concept of geopolitical risk is familiar and visceral and its Russia and China who are at the helm of those risks. This aligns fairly closely with Government thinking.

Many younger Britons, by contrast, are deeply familiar with China, be it through technological or cultural engagement, and the idea that China poses a real threat to their own security feels far removed. Instead, the foreign policy issue they are most concerned about is Gaza and there is therefore growing frustration among younger Britons about how much support Ukraine has received relative to Gaza. Among younger Britons there is, therefore, growing discomfort with the Government’s foreign policy and investment in defence.

This growing chasm between government and the public, and again between older and younger generations, not only creates a major democratic deficit – a problem in its own right, but it also poses a national security risk. Failure to secure public buy-in will limit the public’s willingness to shoulder the costs required to protect UK national security, and, in turn, limit politician’s willingness to do the same. This chasm cannot continue to go ignored.

In part this is about civic engagement. Successive governments have done too little to articulate why national defence matters and even less to engage the public in a serious conversation about what it costs. Education on national security in schools, engagement around national resilience and meeting people where they are, is essential. But it is not just the public that has to learn, so too does Government. For too long military types have shouted into the void about living in “a more dangerous world”, berating the public’s lack of engagement, without listening to the public and their concerns. The public’s calls for greater transparency over defence spending, demands to address domestic challenges, and criticism of the UK’s hypocrisy on the world stage are all valid critiques which the Government must be willing to not only listen to but also respond to.

Rebuilding a shared understanding of national security must then be a two way street. And it won’t happen overnight. But with a little humility, some frank conversations and effective communication, there is an opportunity to build a shared and widely endorsed vision for UK national security. That’s not just a nice to have. It is critical for the UK’s security and prosperity.

 

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