Meddling Strategies: The resurgence of ‘grey zone’ activities and what this means for Labour

The Paris Olympics have just drawn to a close where, amid all the great moments of sporting drama, the heavy security arrangements were always visible in the background. Over 73,000 security personnel, including almost 20,000 soldiers were needed. This is a far cry from the roughly 30,000 security personnel deemed necessary for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics; pre-War on Terror but post the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. The potential threats at the Paris Olympics were myriad, but one of the key concerns was sabotage, and the security presence highlights the need to be more prepared under what we would consider ‘peacetime’ from what is often described as ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey-zone’ warfare.

 Neither hybrid warfare nor grey zone are particularly great descriptions and both suffer from lack of clarity. They also make these activities sound like something new, which they are not. A 2017 report by the Multinational Capability Development Campaign described hybrid warfare as ‘the synchronised use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effects.’ This does not really help generate clarity, though the report does go on to make less jargonistic recommendations. The Russians use the term ‘active measures’.

In essence, all of the above describe the everyday efforts from countries to meddle in the affairs of others for their own benefit, something which has been going on since the first civilisations. The intensity of this meddling varies from state to state based on what they want to achieve, where the target is vulnerable, and what they think they can get away with. However, although this is nothing new, the intensity of this meddling has grown in the last few years.

Meddling strategies can take many forms. Some state’s may seek to influence key stakeholders such as business leaders and politicians through bribery, blackmail or holding economic opportunities ransom – or of course, sanctions. Others may seek to intimidate through aggressive military manoeuvres or sabotage and assassination campaigns. Supporting third parties with aid (including military) can also frustrate the activities of an adversary. Another route is simply to sow division and chaos through misinformation.

In the aftermath of the Cold War it seemed that the meddling strategies of adversaries had fallen away, but they never fully disappeared. In reality what changed was a drop in public awareness of and the political will to tackle these activities, particularly with the focus on the ‘War on Terror’. Our willingness to engage in meddling strategies of our own also declined. Why this happened is hard to say, the glow of victory at the end of the Cold War certainly contributed: many believed the age of geopolitics was over and all states would eventually come to embrace the free and open international order, so why bother competing below the threshold of armed conflict?

It will take years of hard work and difficult decisions to undo the long-term damage done in making us more vulnerable to meddling strategies. Russian money poured into London and firms directly connected to authoritarian regimes (such as the Communist Party of China, the CCP) embedded themselves in our economy. But this was all okay, good even, because Moscow and Beijing would surely change their behaviour over time. Instead the opposite has happened; they have changed us far more than we changed them. The consensus of the national security and business communities present during the Cold War was ripped apart and it will be incredibly difficult to overcome deeply entrenched interests to bind it back together.

Geopolitical competition is once more on the rise, and with it the risk appetite of our adversaries has grown. Russia’s meddling has become far more intense in a bid to weaken NATO’s ability and will to support Ukraine. We have witnessed sabotage efforts at munitions factories, misinformation campaigns and assassination plots. But Russia is not alone. The CCP has also grown far more assertive, including by directly targeting our democratic institutions with cyber attacks.

We used to be adept at meddling strategies ourselves. Historical examples include Tudor era privateers, put to good use interrupting the flow of wealth to Spain. In the Cold War multiple tactics were developed such as the creation of radio stations to help those behind the Iron Curtain access information. After the Cold War however, activities were wound down as the belief set in that democratisation was the natural path for all. To give just one example, in 2014 the Foreign Office stopped part funding (75%) the BBC World Service and a number of foreign language services were shut down, a vital source of impartial information for many living in authoritarian regimes.

The new government inherits a global situation wrought with instability with authoritarianism on the rise. We must remember there is no opting out of this competition, our very existence as a free democratic country constitutes as meddling to our adversaries; it provides their citizens with a model to hope for. Labour must grapple both with how to defend against the meddling strategies of others, and how to develop its own. Recent Russian mapping of our undersea infrastructure reminds us of further vulnerabilities.

The last government lacked a clear strategy for dealing with the meddling of Moscow and Beijing (and others), but did begin to take some necessary steps; such as with the National Security and Investment Act. Allies are also beginning to do the same; after the Balticconnector pipeline incident Norway began an inventory of its undersea infrastructure, a mammoth (but vital) undertaking. Rachel Reeves’ intention to follow an approach of ‘securonomics’ which prioritises the economic security of the nation is a very welcome framework to build on, but more will need to be done.

A rethink of the level of protection around our critical infrastructure will certainly be required. A review of just how extensive our vulnerabilities are, including societal, will need to be conducted. New legislation to make social media companies more accountable and to better ensure businesses work around national security needs rather than vice versa will be needed. This new approach will require careful management. In shielding ourselves from the meddling of others, Labour must be careful not to destroy the freedoms which give us such an edge over our adversaries. In addition, Labour should put fresh energy into rebuilding our own meddling strategies, in conjunction with allies, to weaken our adversaries. This is a realist approach to global affairs, but through strengthening resilience at home and weakening authoritarianism abroad, one with very much progressive foundations.

 

If you enjoyed this piece, see William’s previous blog ‘The challenge facing Labour on Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention’

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