“We need to recognize the irrationality and inhumanity of living in a world overshadowed by nuclear weapons” – Daisaku Ikeda
Whilst the very concept of nuclear weapons is abhorrent to many, they have been the foundation of the UK’s national defence strategy for decades. Nuclear weapons have not been used since WWII. Given the challenging fiscal environment in which the UK SDR is being conducted, should the UK continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent capability?
The UK’s nuclear weapons programme had its origins in the Second World War. In 1941, then Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, authorised the development of an atomic bomb which in 1943 led to an agreement between Churchill and US President Roosevelt that the British work should be subsumed into a larger joint effort – the Manhattan Project. However, this wartime collaboration ended in 1946, following which the Attlee Government decided to resume an independent UK programme to develop an atomic weapon. The UK successfully tested its first atomic bomb in October 1952.
In 1952, the Americans successfully tested a thermonuclear weapon (“H-bomb”), which was much more powerful than the earlier atomic weapons. The Soviet Union followed suit in 1954. Consequently, in the same year, the Cabinet committed the UK to developing a thermonuclear weapon.
Britain’s first operational nuclear weapon was the Blue Danube free-fall bomb, which was carried by the V-bombers (Valiant, Victor and Vulcan) of the RAF’s strategic bomber force from 1956. Increasing concerns over the vulnerability of air-launched nuclear weapons led to the then Prime Minister MacMillan and President Kennedy concluded the Nassau Agreement in 1962, in which the US undertook to make the Polaris missile system available to the UK. The Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile system entered service with the Royal Navy in 1968. The last of the UK’s air-launched nuclear weapons was the WE177 free-fall bomb was retired from service in 1998.
Since 1969, the UK has maintained a Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD). Today, the UK has at least 1 of 4 nuclear-armed submarines continuously on patrol, representing the minimum credible independent nuclear deterrent capability.
The Non-Proliferation Agreement (NPA), brought into force in 1970, is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology (9 nations possess nuclear weapons – US, UK, France, Russia and China have signed the treaty. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have not signed).
At the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine became – albeit briefly – the 3rd largest nuclear power in the world. Three NPA signatories (USA, UK and Russia) persuaded Ukraine to return the nuclear warheads to Russia, and in return Russia, the USA and the UK were prohibited from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine. This agreement was signed in Budapest on the 5 Dec 1994.
However, just 2 decades after this agreement was signed, Russia attacked Ukraine in Crimea, and 8 years later launched a full invasion. The concept of deterrence is that any potential adversary would believe that the cost of attacking would not be outweighed by the benefits. If Ukraine still had nuclear weapons, would President Putin have invaded?
Indeed, President Putin has regularly threatened nuclear escalation should the West get involved in the Ukraine war, and despite the reassurance that the US and UK provided under the 1994 Budapest Memo, western political resolve has been tempered by Putin’s threatening rhetoric. Despite the relative success of the NPA, Russia’s illegal and brutal invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the vulnerability of a defensive strategy based purely on conventional weapons when attacked by a nuclear power.
The nuclear deterrent costs around 6% of the UK’s £56.4Bn defence budget each year. However, the UK is in the middle of replacing the Vanguard nuclear submarines with the Dreadnaught Class, which consumes an additional 6% of the Defence budget; the UK will spend over £118Bn on its nuclear deterrence capability over the next decade. This means that for the duration of the upgrade process, 12% of the defence budget is not available to spend on conventional military capability – ships tanks and fighters that remain an essential bedrock of our nation’s military power. Even with an increase of defence spending to 2.5% GDP, the UK will face difficult defence choices to live within its fiscal means.
Land-based and air-launched nuclear weapons are vulnerable to enemy attack unless stockpiles are so large as to make targeting all simultaneously extremely difficult. Both Russia and the USA have >5000 warheads each, but the UK has <300. CASD ensures that the UK’s nuclear weapons capability cannot be easily located and targeted and thus enables a credible independent military capability with significantly smaller stockpile of weapons.
However, this all relies on the submarines’ ability to operate covertly in the world’s oceans. With the rapid advances in technology, how long before submarines no longer have freedom to operate covertly in the world’s oceans and their strategic advantage is rendered obsolete?
And, notwithstanding the huge investment, the deterrence value is an amalgam of military capability and political resolve; your adversary must believe that any attack would be met with a robust response. Only the UK PM has the authority to launch nuclear weapons, so the deterrence capability is heavily dependent on a committed and robust political resolve.
But not all politicians are committed to the deterrence policy. The former leader of the Labour Party – Jeremy Corbyn – was a member of CND since the age of 15, and he believed strongly in a nuclear-free Britain. How would a potential adversary view the risk/benefit equation should the UK’s political resolve change?
The shifting sands of political priorities makes investments in long-term nuclear weapons problematic. The UK government has long believed that maintaining an independent nuclear capability is the only way to ensure continuity; a reliance on partnerships might create vulnerabilities. Indeed, with President Trump questioning the viability of NATO, and making clear that Europe needs to do more to tackle the Russian threat, Europe might well look to France and the UK as part of a review of its collective military deterrent capability.
As for expanding the UK’s nuclear weapons arsenal to air-launched weapons, although this might have some appeal, it would be extremely expensive. Under the terms of the NPA the UK could not buy US weapons, so would need to develop a new class of warheads specifically for this task. This would involve a change to UK’s long-held strategy of maintaining a minimum deterrence capability and would also consume an even greater proportion of limited defence resources. As a result, CASD looks likely to remain the military priority for HMG.
Although nuclear weapons remain extremely controversial, it appears likely that they will endure as a cornerstone of the UK’s defence strategy, at least for the next few decades. However, it is significantly less certain whether the NPA will be sufficient to combat the growing demand from vulnerable nations who believe that the only way to guarantee national security is through a nuclear deterrent capability.
“We are told that the possession of nuclear weapons – in some cases even the testing of these weapons – is essential for national security. But this argument can be made by other countries as well.” – Joseph Rotblat
If you enjoyed this piece, click here to read Sean’s previous episode on the military challenges facing the UK and listen to Sean’s podcast series ‘InDefence’ here on YouTube.
